Women play victims in Thomas Hardy’s short stories, roles that were Ess

Women play victims in Thomas Hardy’s short stories, roles that were typical of Victorian women in general â€Å"Women play victims in Thomas Hardy’s short stories, roles that were typical of Victorian women in general† Discuss with references at least three of Hardy’s short stories Thomas Hardy in his short stories â€Å"The Withered Arm†, â€Å"Tony Kytes, the Arch Deceiver† and the Winters and the Palmleys† presents his readers with a series of unsettling visions of the relations between men and women, women mainly coming worse off. For example Rhoda of â€Å"The Withered Arm†, the poor outcast milkmaid, not even respected by her own son, or pretty Harriet Palmley, the wolf in sheep’s clothing, evil due to her education, therefore not a victim, but instead a horrible person. Gertrude also, a good, obedient, â€Å"rosy cheeked titsy-totsy little body enough† until she gets her arm withered from a curse that drives her to desperation to find a cure for the â€Å"disfigurement†. All these women, due to the fact that they’re female, all ended off worse off and in the course of this essay I am going to analyse whether his female characters were victims or merely women of their time. Hardy’s stories, mainly set 50 years before they were written, are set mostly in the 1830’s period of Victorian Britain, when women were considered lower than men and didn’t usually get any rights or education, especially in the rural areas such as Wessex, where Hardy's â€Å"Wessex Tales† where set. Women were also oppressed in the way of not being allowed high place jobs, the vote and certainly not a place in Parliament or anything that might change Britain in any way, which was quite ironic considering Britain was being ruled by Queen Victoria, a women h... ...herself. The other two, Unity and Hannah are in the same boat in the way that they both want to steal Tony away from Milly but when it comes to Tony actually asking them to marry him they both refuse out of pride. They are not victims but women of their time, so they do not gain my pity, as that’s just the way it was. As for the male characters such as Lodge, who dies peacefully of old age, leaving most of his money to a reformatory for boys after being the main victimiser and Tony Kytes also, after humiliating Milly totally and having a happy ending is unfair considering what happened to all the women. I think Hardy does exaggerate the victimisation of the women and praise the men in his stories and I do feel sympathy for the majority of the women but as for the rights, characters and education of all the women, that’s them just being women of their time.

How Television Has Impacted Technology Essay

Television was introduced in 1949 but very few people had it because it was extremely expensive. The only channels people could watch were NBC and CBS. Television became increasingly popular because it was entertainment without going and sitting in the movie theaters. As TV became more popular, it became more affordable. People would hear about television through word of mouth, news, radio and newspaper. Everybody liked the idea of being entertained and staying at home. By the 1960s most families has TV sets in their living rooms, depending on if they liked being entertained at home. Television in the United States has grown year after year and has made a big impact on American culture in many ways. TV has taken a big part in violence in society, the news, how people are stereotyped, childhood obesity, family values, social interaction, and so much more. In my opinion one of the biggest impacts that television has had on American culture is childhood obesity. Obesity is considered a form of malnutrition in which food energy is stored as fat due to being unused. Child obesity is bred within the home and the television is a major contributor to it. The energy we consume from food needs to be used up by the body on a daily basis through physical exertion. An overweight child devoting a major portion of time to watching television is at risk to becoming obese. Television is certainly a contributor to that obesity. Kids these days are getting bigger and bigger, while television shows are growing and growing. To me, that is a big issue and television affects it a lot. Back in the day children enjoyed going outside to play, getting involved in sports or just anything outdoors. I feel like as of today there are now only about a quarter of the kids that enjoy doing outdoors stuff like that. The other 75% of kids choose to stay inside because most likely there favorite TV show is on or there is a movie that they just have to watch. Those kids are losing their time to play outside and mainly burn and lose calories because they are just sitting there watching TV for hours and hours. Obesity is known to be one of the major health concerns among both children and adults in the United States today. It is suggested by certain groups that children should not watch more than two hours of television a day. This in my opinion is already too much because that is where childhood obesity all gets started. The average child n the United States regularly watches between 2-3 hours of television a day and many children now days have their own television set in their bedroom. Not only are children inactive while they are watching television, they often snack on unhealthy food choices. And like I said, establishing unhealthy food habits as a child can often continue into adulthood. Investi gators have hypothesized that television viewing cause’s obesity by one or more of three mechanisms: (1) displacement of physical activity, (2) increased calorie consumption while watching or caused by the effects of advertising, and (3) reduced resting metabolism. The relationship between television viewing and obesity has been examined in a relatively large number of cross-sectional epidemiologic studies but few longitudinal studies. Many of these studies have found relatively weak, positive associations, but others have found no associations or mixed results; however, the weak and variable associations found in these studies may be the result of limitations in measurement. Even studies for reducing the amount of television intake have been completed. They do not test â€Å"reducing television time† directly, but the results that they get may help to reduce the amount of risk for obesity or help promote weight loss in obese children. â€Å"An experimental study was designed specifically to test directly the causal relationship between television viewing behaviors and body fatness. The results of this randomized, controlled trial provide evidence that television viewing is a cause of increased body fatness and that reducing television viewing is a promising strategy for preventing childhood obesity. † I really think parents need to take a stand to their children by limiting the amount of time they spend in front of the television, before it gets too late and they have an obese child. Removing televisions from children’s bedrooms and putting time limits on the TV may be a good way for parents to reduce the risk of obesity in children. Parents must serve as role models because their television viewing habits influence their children’s. Parents should also limit the frequency of television viewing. Overweight and obese children need to be encouraged to do more physical activity such as walking, playing and limiting their television time. Children may also need structured physical activity times to divert them away from television. â€Å"Although the increase in childhood obesity is not caused solely by television watching, Dr. Reginald Washington points out in the editorial that accompanies the articles, â€Å"Society, as a whole, must realize that to effectively control and prevent this obesity epidemic, all risk factors must simultaneously be reduced. † A study by the University of Liverpool psychologists has shown that it is to be true that obese and overweight children increase their food intake by more than 100% after watching food advertisements on television. Children all over the world are exposed to a huge number of TV advertisements, primarily for fast foods and sweets. Some say that it is not the amount of TV; it is the number of junk food commercials that advertise unhealthy foods and constantly play over and over. It is miserable that people blame television as a result to childhood obesity but the United States is starting to get very lazy when it comes to situations like this, therefore I truly believe TV is one of the dominate reasons of why children are becoming obese. I feel like this impact has been mainly negative on American culture. Television advertisers get talked down to by research groups, wanting them to take away all the unhealthy food commercials. Childhood obesity coming from television watchers makes American culture look very bad. When you find out that all it takes is television sets in a kids bedroom and high-quality shows that make children sit, stare and snack to become obese. It really puts a depressing look on America. In my opinion it is a very negative result because it used to not be this way at all. The parents and children put themselves in the situation to becoming obese and television just is an excuse for whenever they actually are obese. I know I will never let my children or close friends get this way due to excess amount of television watching. I have time to watch all my shows I like during the day and still get a good exercise in. I believe that all people can watch their weight and not become obese if they really try. So I really hope the culture changes and fix its look on television with obesity. I do believe that the internet will be used more wisely than television as a medium for delivering content. Television is an older and dull way of showing and sharing shows, movies and advertisements, while now days the nternet can do the same plus a whole lot more. Internet is a lot easier to get to because so many people have smart phones or laptops to be able to quickly access it. I feel like even now I start to see more and more people of all ages on their laptop/computer/smart phone rather than sitting down and watching television shows. Internet is a new (compared to TV) and entertaining way to access World Wide Web. News and broadcast stations are all starting to put their information and ideas on the internet even before they send them to television. While putting the internet into question about my topic, as much as I hate seeing younger kids run around with their own smart phone and/or laptop, it would really help society. Internet will help a lot more in this situation because children that do have smart phones will be able to play outside and exercise with their phone in hand. If the kids do go outside while on their phone it will stop them from sitting in front of a television set, sitting, staring and snacking. Therefore, it will lower the childhood obesity rate in the United States. Childhood obesity is a very heartbreaking yet occurring thing that television influenced and started in the U. S. It has been a very big impact on television and American Culture. After all, we are all hoping and praying that parents help their children get back to how it was back in the day. Have the children exercising, playing outside, and getting involved in sports that way they only spend approximately one hour watching television. We have to lower the childhood obesity rate and will continue to try and stop every way that is involved in it.

Corporate governance - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 24 Words: 7173 Downloads: 2 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Statistics Essay Did you like this example? CHAPTER IV INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE As noted earlier, the need for corporate governance arises from the potential conflicts of interest among participants (stakeholders) in corporate structure. These are often referred as agency problems arise from two main sources. First, different participants have different goals and preferences. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Corporate governance" essay for you Create order Second, the participants have imperfect information as to each others actions, knowledge and preferences. Berle and Means (1932) addressed these conflicts by examining the separation of ownership and control. They noted that this separation, in the absence of other corporate governance mechanisms, provide executives with the ability to act in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of shareholders. However, executives activities are potentially constrained by numerous factors that constitute and influence the governance of the corporations that they manage. These factors can be thought of as either internal control mechanisms (such as the board) or external control mechanisms (such as the market for corporate control). An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although institutional investors are the predominant players in some countries financial markets and are therefore important in corporate governance, yet the ownership structures and other governance characteristics differ across markets. These differences are attributable in part to legal and regulatory systems and in part to the manner in which the markets have evolved. These characteristics will continue to vary across countries, leading to differences in the role and influences of institutional investors in corporate governance. Previous researchers have shown that because of the costs involved, only large shareholders have the incentive to provide extensive monitoring of management. Whether institutions as large shareholders should, or will, provide such monitoring depends in part on the constraints to which they are subjected, their objectives, and their preferences for liquidity. Keeping the above into consideration, it is pertinent to examine the intricacies of institutional holdings in the governance matters of Indian corporates. Many a time, institutional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The ongoing debate as to the institutional holdings and the corporate governance is very live or interactive in the academics these days too. The results of earlier studies are inconclusive as to the deterministic value of the one or the other. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score index has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark to rate sampled firms in terms of corporate governance. The institutional holdings in terms of equity investment has been expressed in percentages to total investment and comparatively, in terms of the relative composition of the institutional equity investment. This chapter makes a detailed analysis of the dynamics of corporate governance and the institutional holdings in the following three perspectives: 4.1) Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition 4.2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance (dependent variable) 4.3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The results obtained for the sampled in this regard are reported, in an analytical frame, here as under: 4.1.1) Status of Institutional Holdings: The results obtained for sampled companies as regard to the status of institutional holdings in the sampled companies during the study period 2004-08 are summarized in table no. 4.1 given below: Table 4.1 Institutional Holdings in the Sampled Companies Institutional Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) Below 5 61 30.5 53 26.5 46 23.0 46 23.0 47 23.5 5-10 34 17.0 31 15.5 30 15.0 26 13.0 27 13.5 10-15 30 15.0 34 17.0 22 11.0 25 12.5 22 11.0 15-26 37 18.5 40 20.0 43 21.5 43 21.5 42 21.0 26-50 36 18.0 38 19.0 54 27.0 55 27.5 55 27.5 Above 50 02 1.0 04 2.0 05 2.5 05 2.5 07 3.5 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 The information inputs reported in the present table reveals that the proportions of institutional holdings in the sampled companies have increased over the years. The numbers of companies with larger proportions of institutional holdings have been increasing and the numbers of companies with smaller proportions of holdings have been declining over the study period. As institutions have above 50 percent holdings in only 1 percent companies in 2004, where as in the last year of the study period, it increased to 3.5 percent. Similarly, institutions have holdings from 26 to 50 percent in 18 percent companies in 2004 that rises to 27.5 percent companies in 2008. The same trend follows for the companies in which institutions have holdings from 15 to 26 percent. The decreasing number of companies with relatively lower institutional holdings also validates it. As institutions have less than 5 percent stake in 30.5 percent companies in 2004, which reduced to only 23.5 percent companies in 2008. Similarly, institutions have holdings up to 10 percent in 17 percent companies that reduced to 13.5 percent in the last year of the study period. Thus, it is observed that institutional investors have been increasing their stake in the sampled companies over the study period. Hence, it is inferred that institutional investors have been consistently getting more interested in the sampled companies over the study period. 4.1.2 Constituents of Institutional Holdings: As noted earlier, Institutional holdings have been further classified into three categories i.e., Mutual Fund, (Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies) and Foreign Institutional Investors. The results obtained for the sampled companies as regard to the status of Mutual Funds holdings in relation to the total shareholdings and to the total institutional investors in the sampled companies during the study period 2004-08 are summarized in part (a) and part (b) of the table no. 4.2 given below: Table 4.2 (a) MF Holdings in Relation To Total Shareholdings Mutual Fund Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) Below 5 140 70.0 143 71.5 117 58.5 113 56.5 119 59.5 5-10 42 21.0 34 17.0 52 26.0 54 27.0 41 20.5 10-15 14 7.0 14 7.0 22 11.0 23 11.5 29 14.5 15-20 03 1.5 07 3.5 07 3.5 07 3.5 07 3.5 Above 20 01 0.5 02 1.0 02 1.0 03 1.5 04 2.0 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 Table 4.2 (b) MF Holdings in Relation to Total Institutional Holdings Mutual Funds Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) 0-20 96 48.0 104 52.0 100 50.0 103 51.5 101 50.5 20-40 55 27.5 38 19.0 41 20.5 50 25.0 47 23.5 40-60 22 11.0 21 10.5 24 12.0 14 7.0 23 11.5 60-80 09 4.5 18 9.0 19 9.5 16 8.0 17 8.5 Above 80 18 9.0 19 9.5 16 8.0 17 8.5 12 6.0 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table depict that mutual funds have increased their proportions of shareholdings in relation to the total shareholdings over the study period. The number of sampled companies with higher proportions of mutual funds holdings has been increasing over the study period. Similarly, the number of sampled companies with lower proportions of mutual funds holdings has been decreasing over the same period. As mutual funds have more than 20 percent holdings in 0.5 percent companies in 2004, which increased to 2 percent companies at the end of the study period. Similarly, Mutual Funds have holdings to the extent of 20 percent only in 1.5 percent companies in 2004 that increased to 3.5 percent companies in 2008. It is also observed that there were only 14 companies in 2004 in which mutual funds holdings were from 10 to 15 percent, which increased to more than double at the end of the study period. It is also validated by the observations of the companies in which mutual funds have lower stake. There were 70 percent companies in which mutual funds had less than 5 percent holdings and the proportion of companies with such holdings reduced to 59.5 percent in 2008. Hence, it is inferred that mutual fund companies have become more interested in the sampled companies over the study period. The information inputs reported in part (b) of the present table reveal out that there is no consistency in the investment pattern of mutual funds in the sampled companies over the study period. Mutual fund holdings in relation to total institutional holdings have remained more or less between zero and 20 percent in about 50 percent companies. On an average in 23 percent companies, mutual funds hold 20 to 40 percent shares. Mutual Funds reduced their holdings in 20 to 40 percent category in sampled companies over the study period. Where as there has not been major change in the number of companies with 40 to 60 percent mutual fund holdings. On the other hand, mutual funds have increased their stake from 60 to 80 percent in sampled companies over the study period. There are 9 companies with such holdings, which increased to 17 companies in 2008. But the number of sampled companies with mutual funds holdings more than 80 percent has gone down over the study period. As in 2004, there a re 9 percent companies that reduced to 6 percent at the end of the study period. Hence, no inference can be drawn about the investment behaviour of mutual funds in relation to the total institutional holdings in sampled companies over the study period. The results obtained for sampled companies as regard to the status of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings in relation to the total shareholdings and total institutional holdings in the sampled companies during the study period 2004-08 are summarized in part (a) and part (b) of the table no. 4.3 given below: Table 4.3 (a) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings in Relation To Total Shareholdings Bank, FI and IC Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) Below 5 127 63.5 135 67.5 142 71.0 139 69.5 141 70.5 5-10 36 18.0 28 14.0 27 13.5 34 17.0 29 14.5 10-15 19 9.5 24 12.0 19 9.5 18 9.0 18 9.0 15-20 09 4.5 08 4.0 07 3.5 04 2.0 08 4.0 Above 20 09 4.5 05 2.5 05 2.5 05 2.5 04 2.0 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 Table 4.3 (b) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings in Relation to Total Institutional Holdings Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) 0-20 70 35.0 90 45.0 103 51.5 99 49.5 99 49.5 20-40 34 17.0 34 17.0 41 20.5 41 20.5 34 17.0 40-60 29 14.5 30 15.0 16 8.0 23 11.5 37 18.5 60-80 21 10.5 13 6.5 17 8.5 15 7.5 08 4.0 Above 80 46 23.0 33 16.5 23 11.5 22 11.0 22 11.0 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 The information inputs reported in the part (a) of the present table depicts that the proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies in the sampled companies have decreased over the years. The numbers of companies with lower proportions of these holdings have been increasing and the numbers of companies with higher proportions of holdings have been decreasing over the study period. As in 63.5 percent companies, Banks and others hold less than 5 percent shares in 2004 while in 2008, 70.5 percent companies have the same holdings reflecting that over the study period, the above category of institutional investors have shown less interest in the sampled companies. Similarly, Banks and others hold up to 10 percent of total shareholdings in 36 companies which reduced to 27 in the year 2006 and finally to 29 companies in the year 2008. Likewise, the number of companies with more than 20 percent holdings has reduced from 4.5 percent in 2004 to 2 percent in 2008. Thus, it is observed that Banks, FIs and ICs have withdrawn their substantial holdings in some companies while number of companies with marginal holdings has increased. Hence, it is inferred that Banks, FIs and ICs are getting less interested in the sampled companies over the study period. The information inputs reported in the part (b) of the present table depict the results coherent with the results shown in part (a) as Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have decreased their holdings in relation to total institutional holdings in the sampled companies over the study period as well. They have more than 80 percent holdings in 23 percent companies in 2004 but in the last year of the study period, it was just in 11 percent companies. Similarly, these investors had 60 to 80 percent holdings in 21 companies in 2004, but in 2008, the number of companies with such holdings reduced to only 8 companies. The same is validated by the proportional increase in the number of companies with relatively lower holdings. Banks and others held to the limit of 20 percent shares in 70 companies in 2004 and in 2008, the number of companies with such holdings rose to 99. These investors have shown more interest in increasing their holdings from 40 percent to 60 percent in the sampled companies over the study period as they had such holdings in 14.5 percent companies in 2004 that increased to 18.5 percent in the last year of the study period. Thus, it is observed that the above-mentioned investors are gradually reducing their stakes to the lower levels in proportion to total institutional holdings in the sampled companies over the study period. Hence, it is inferred that Banks, FIs and ICs have been loosing interest in the sampled companies. The results obtained for sampled companies as regard to the status of FII holdings in relation to the total shareholdings and to the total institutional investors in the sampled companies during the study period 2004-08 are summarized in part (a) and part (b) of the table no. 4.4 given below: Table 4.4 (a) FII Holdings in Relation To Total Shareholdings FII Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) Below 5 133 66.5 114 57.0 103 51.5 100 50.0 92 46.0 5-10 29 14.5 30 15.0 24 12.0 24 12.0 36 18.0 10-15 17 8.5 22 11.0 23 11.5 23 11.5 26 13.0 15-20 09 4.5 13 6.5 15 7.5 25 12.5 18 9.0 20-26 12 6.0 21 10.5 35 17.5 28 14.0 28 14.0 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 Table 4.4 (b) FII Holdings in Relation to Total Institutional Holdings FII Holdings (%) Number of Companies 2004 N (%) 2005 N (%) 2006 N (%) 2007 N (%) 2008 N (%) 0-20 115 57.5 83 41.5 74 37.0 69 34.5 62 31.0 20-40 20 10.0 35 17.5 33 16.5 28 14.0 39 19.5 40-60 29 14.5 36 18.0 33 16.5 34 17.0 43 21.5 60-80 23 11.5 25 12.5 35 17.5 40 20.0 33 16.5 Above 80 13 6.5 21 10.5 25 12.5 29 14.5 23 11.5 Total 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 The information inputs reported in the part (a) of the present table reveals that the proportions of FII holdings in relation to total shareholdings in the sampled companies have increased over the years. The numbers of companies with higher proportions of FII holdings have been increasing and the numbers of companies with smaller proportions have been decreasing over the study period. As FIIs have 20 to 26 percent holdings in only 6 percent companies in 2004, where as in the last year of the study period, it increased to 14 percent. Similarly, FIIs have holdings from 15 to 20 percent in 9 companies in 2004 that got doubled to 18 companies in 2008. The same trend follows for the companies with FII holdings from 10 to 15 percent. FIIs had such holdings in 17 companies only in 2004 but in the last year of the study period, it increased to 26 companies. The decreasing number of companies with relatively lower FII holdings also validates it. In nutshell, the FIIs have been consistently increasing their stake in relation to the total shareholdings in the sampled companies over the study period. Hence, it is inferred that institutional investors have been consistently getting more interested in the sampled companies over the study period. The information inputs reported in the part (b) of the present table also depict results consistent with the results shown for part (a). The proportion of FII holdings in relation to the institutional holdings in the sampled companies has also increased over the years. As institutions had above 80 percent holdings in only 6.5 percent companies in 2004, where as in the last year of the study period, it increased to 11.5 percent companies. Similarly, FIIs had holdings from 60 to 80 percent in 23 companies in 2004 that increased to 33 companies in 2008. The same trend follows for the companies with FII holdings from 40 to 60 percent. The decreasing number of companies with relatively lower FII holdings also validates it. As FIIs have less than 20 percent stake in 57.5 percent companies in 2004 which reduced to only 31 percent companies in 2008. Hence, it is inferred that FIIs have shown more interest in the sampled companies over the study period. Resume It can be observed from the result outputs of the first section that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies is consistently increasing with higher institutional holdings where as the number of companies are decreasing with lower proportions of institutional holdings. The mutual fund investors have also increased their holdings in relation to the total shareholdings over the study period. The number of companies with higher mutual fund holdings has been increasing over the years. Similarly, the number of companies with lower mutual fund holdings has been decreasing over the study period. But the results of observations of mutual fund holdings in relation to total institutional holdings state otherwise. Mutual funds have increased their proportions of holdings to the total shareholdings in the sampled companies over the study period but it is not so in relation to the total institutional h oldings. Therefore, the investment pattern of mutual funds is not clear. Where as Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have decreased their proportional holdings in the sampled companies over the study period. There has been decline in the number of sampled companies with higher proportion of the Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Validating the same, the numbers of companies with lower proportion of above holdings have been increasing over the study period. The results are consistent for the proportion of Banks, FIs and ICs in relation to total institutional holdings as well. To the contrary, foreign institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the sampled companies over the years. The number of companies is increasing with higher FII holdings and the number of companies is decreasing with lower proportion of FII holdings. The results are similar in relation to the total institutional holdings as well. Hence, at the end of the section it is infer red on the basis of result outputs that institutional investors in total and foreign institutional investors are getting more interested in the sampled companies over the study period. Banks, financial institutions and insurance companies are getting less interested in the same companies over the study period. And the results are inconclusive for the mutual funds. 4.2.1 Status of Corporate Governance Score in Sampled Companies: The Corporate Governance status of sampled companies is depicted in table 4.5. Total sampled of 200 companies has been divided into four quartiles of 50 companies each. The first quartile shows the company codes with highest corporate governance scores with in the range of 58 to 76 with the average score of 62.5. The second quartile shows the company codes with higher corporate governance scores with in the range of 52 to 58 with the average score of 54.3. The third quartile shows the company codes with lower corporate governance scores with in the range of 46 to 52 with the average score of 48.7. The fourth quartile shows the company codes with lowest corporate governance scores with in the range of 26 to 46 with the average score of 40.04. Table 4.5 Status of Corporate Governance in Sampled Companies Sampled Companies Number of Companies Sampled Company (Code) Range Average Governance Score Q1 50 2,5,6,11,13,15,21,26,27,28,29,37,39, 41,42,47,48,53,56,68,69,71,72,75,76,7778,79,84,86,88,91,93,96,97,98,102, 104,106,119,124,132,135,147,171,173180,189,194,198 58-76 62.5 Q2 50 10,17,18,30,31,33,34,36,38,45,46,52, 54,55,57,58,60,61,62,63,64,65,80,85, 100,101,103,108,117,118,121,125, 134,142,149,150,156,160,167,170, 175,177,179,183,184,185,186,187, 190,197 52-58 54.3 Q3 50 1,3,4,9,14,16,19,20,23,40,43,44,50, 59,66,70,73,74,82,83,92,94,99,105, 107,109,110,113,115,120,123,123, 127,129,130,137,139,151,152,154, 155,162,163,165,169,182,188,192, 196,200 46-52 48.7 Q4 50 7,8,12,22,24,25,32,35,49,51,81,87, 89,90,95,111,112,114,116,122,126, 128,131,133,136,138,140,141,143, 144,145,146,148,153,157,158,159, 161,164,166,168,172,174,176,178, 181,191,193,195,199 26-46 40.04 4.2.2 Relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.6 as under: Part (a) of the present study table reveals out the (%) institutional holdings along with corporate governance score for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to institutional holdings and corporate governance score Table 4.6 (a) Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance Institutional Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N Average N Average N Average N Average N Average 0-10 95 47.84 84 47.44 76 46.74 72 47.06 74 47.42 10-25 64 53.50 70 52.79 62 52.21 63 51.44 60 51.53 25-50 39 56.51 42 56.43 57 56.32 60 56.37 59 55.80 Above50 02 50.50 04 56.00 05 55.00 05 52.60 07 54.43 200 200 200 200 200 Table 4.6 (b) Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance Institutional Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant 47.18 46.98 46.64 46.64 47.05 b Value 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 SE 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 R2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 t-value 6.75* 6.73* 6.63* 6.63* 6.21* D/W 1.825 .825 1.868 1.84 1.78 Predictor: Institutional Holdings; Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance Score *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table reveals out that the larger proportions of institutional holdings (to the level of 50 percent) have higher corporate governance score in sampled companies over the study period. Similarly, the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. The sampled companies in which institutional holdings are from 25 to 50 percent have the average corporate governance score of 56.51 points in 2004, 56.32 points in 2006 and 55.80 points in 2008. These score points are highest in all the years. Where as lower governance scores are observed for lower proportions of institutional holdings. As the sampled companies in which institutional holdings are to the level of 10 percent have poor average governance scores. They are 47.84 score points in 2004, 46.74 score points in 2006 and 47.42 score points in 2008. Similarly, the sampled companies with 10 to 25 percent institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores than the companies with lower holdings and lower governance scores than the companies with higher institutional holdings over the study period. It can be inferred from the above results that there is very strong and positive relationship between institutional holdings and Corporate Governance. The statistical significance of these findings through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. The parameters also validate the above inference, as the degree of dependence between two variables is higher over the study period. All the values are also considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.2.3 Relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.7 as under: Part (a) of the present study table reveals out the (%) mutual funds holdings along with corporate governance score for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score Table 4.7 (a) MF Holdings and Corporate Governance Mutual Fund Holdings Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (%) N Average N Average N Average N Average N Average 0-5 140 50.5 143 51.0 117 50.9 113 50.6 119 50.3 5-10 42 51.8 34 50.9 52 52.0 54 52.5 41 53.6 10-15 14 55.2 14 54.2 22 51.4 23 52.4 29 52.0 Above15 04 57.8 09 54.8 09 54.0 10 51.0 11 52.6 200 200 200 200 200 Table 4.7 (b) MF Holdings and Corporate Governance Mutual Fund Holdings (%) Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant 49.32 50.07 50.32 50.48 50.27 b Value 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.14 SE 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.84 R2 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 t-value 3.97* 2.54* 1.78 1.49 1.98 D/W 1.96 1.92 1.90 1.85 1.85 Predictor: MF Holdings; Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance Score *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table reveals out that larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher corporate governance score of sampled companies in first two years of the study period only. The sampled companies in which institutions have holdings more than 15 percent have highest average corporate governance score of 57.8 points in 2004. For the same category of mutual funds holdings, the average score is highest at 54.8 points in 2005. Similarly, the companies in which mutual funds have lowest holdings, the average corporate governance score is also lowest in these very years. Hence, it can be inferred that there is strong and positive relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance scores in these years. But same inference cannot be drawn for the other years of the study period. In 2006, the companies with mutual funds holdings of 5 to 10 percent have average governance score is 52 points, which declined to 51.4 points in the higher mutual fund holding category. Similarly, the average governance score of sampled companies are relatively lower in which mutual funds have holdings more than 15 percent in 2007 too. In last year of the study period also, the relationship between both the variables is not clear. Hence, it can be inferred that weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. The statistical significance of these observations through regression analysis is presented in the second part of the table. The regression parameters also show that weak relationship exists between mutual fund holdings and corporate governance as the degree of dependence is lower in all the years except for in 2004 and 2005. Similarly, values of only year 2004 and 2005 are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.2.4 Relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs holdings and corporate governance: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.8 as under: Part (a) of the present study table reveals out the (%) (Banks, FIs and ICs) holdings along with corporate governance score for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to (%) (Banks, FIs and ICs) holdings and corporate governance score Table 4.8 (a) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings and Corporate Governance Bank, FIs and ICs Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N Average N Average N Average N Average N Average 0-5 127 49.8 135 49.7 142 49.9 139 49.7 141 49.8 5-10 36 53.5 28 54.1 27 55.4 34 54.6 29 53.9 10-15 19 55.2 24 55.9 19 54.4 18 55.2 18 58.1 Above15 18 53.8 13 54.5 12 54.8 09 57.0 12 53.4 Total 200 200 200 200 200 Table 4.8 (b) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings and Corporate Governance Bank, FIs and IC Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant 49.93 49.76 49.77 49.34 49.29 b Value 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.30 SE 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 t-value 2.96* 3.39* 3.37* 4.33* 4.35* D/W 1.77 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.76 Predictor: Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings; Dependent Variable: Governance Score *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table reveals out that the larger proportion of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings (to the level of 15 percent) have higher corporate governance score in sampled companies in all the years of the study period. The sampled companies in which institutional holdings are from 10 to 15 percent have the average corporate governance score of 55.2 points in 2004, 54.4 points in 2006 and 58.1 points in 2008. Similarly, the sampled companies with Banks, Ifs and ICs holdings of 5 to 10 percent have average governance score of 53.5 points in 2004, 55.4 points in 2006 and 53.9 in 2008. To validate it further, lower governance scores are observed for lower proportion of this category of institutional holdings in sampled companies. As the sampled companies in which Banks, FIs and ICs holdings are to the level of 5 percent have poorest average governance scores. They are 49.8 score points in 2004, 49.9 score points in 2006 and 49.8 score points in 2008. To the contrary, the sampled companies with largest proportions of institutional holdings have average governance score of sampled companies is 53.8 points in 2004, 54.8 points in 2006 and 53.4 points which is much greater than of companies with smallest institutional holdings. It can be inferred from the above results that there is very strong and positive relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs holdings and Corporate Governance. The statistical significance of these findings through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. The parameters draw the same inference as drawn above since the degree of dependence between two variables is higher in all the years of the study period. All the values are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.2.5 Relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.9 as under: Part (a) of the present study table reveals out the (%) FII Holdings along with corporate governance score for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to FII Holdings and corporate governance score Table 4.9 (a) FII Holdings and Corporate Governance FII Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N Average N Average N Average N Average N Average 0-5 133 49.2 114 48.4 103 47.9 100 48.6 92 48.1 5-10 29 53.2 30 53.4 24 52.3 24 48.7 36 50.7 10-15 17 57.1 22 53.8 23 55.4 23 55.6 26 55.8 Above15 21 58.0 34 58.1 50 56.3 53 56.1 46 56.0 Total 200 200 200 200 200 Table 4.9 (b) FII Holdings and Corporate Governance FII Holdings (%) Corporate Governance Score 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant 49.11 48.63 48.11 48.28 48.57 b Value 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.36 SE 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.78 R2 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 t-value 5.98* 6.15* 6.46* 6.07* 5.47* D/W 1.81 1.80 1.83 1.86 1.80 Predictor: FII Holdings; Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance Score *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table reveals out that the larger proportions of FII holdings have higher corporate governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. The sampled companies in which FII holdings are above 15 percent have the average corporate governance score of 58 points in 2004, 56.3 points in 2006 and 56 points in 2008. These score points are highest in all the years. Similarly, the sampled companies in which FIIs have 10 to 15 percent holdings also have higher average governance scores. In 2004, the average governance score is 57.1 points for such category where as in 2006, it is 55.4 points and in the last year of the study period, it is 55.8 points. To validate it further, it is observed that the smaller proportion of FII holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. As the sampled companies in which FII holdings are to the level of 5 percent have poorest average governance scores. They are 49.2 score points in 2004, 47.9 score points in 2006 and 48.1 score points in 2008. Likewise, the sampled companies with 5 to 10 percent FII holdings have poorer average governance score of 53.2 points in 2004, 52.3 points in 2006 and 50.7 points in 2008. It can be inferred from the above results that there exists very strong and positive relationship between FII holdings and Corporate Governance. The statistical significance of these outcomes through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. The parameters also validate the inferences drawn above, as the degree of dependence is higher in all the years. All the values are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. Resume The result outputs of the second section state that very strong and positive relationship exists between institutional holdings and governance scores. The companies in which institutional investors have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance scores. Similarly, the corporates in which institutional investors have lower proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores. The result outputs for the relationship between first component of institutional holdings and corporate governance state that weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and governance score. There is poor evidence as to higher proportions of mutual funds holdings result in improved governance practices in corporates and lower proportions of the mutual funds holdings result in poor governance practices in companies. Whereas, the contrary results are observed for the second component of institutional holdings. Banks, FIs and ICs observe very strong and positive relationship wit h governance scores. The corporations with larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs have good governance practices and the companies with lower proportions show poor governance practices. The results observed for the third component are coherent with the results second component of institutional investors. Very strong and positive relationship is also observed between Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. As the larger proportions of foreign institutional holdings show significantly higher governance scores and lower proportions of holdings show relatively poor governance scores. Hence, it is inferred that companies in which institutional investors have higher stake, observe better corporate governance practices than the companies with lower institutional stake. Likewise, the companies with higher stake of Banks, FIs, ICs and FIIs observe better governance practices than the companies with lower stake. But the alternate inference is drawn for mutual funds. 4.3.1 Relationship between corporate governance and institutional holdings: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.10 as under: Part (a) of the present study table reveals out the governance score along with the (%) institutional holdings for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to governance score and institutional holdings Table 4.10 (a) Corporate Governance and Institutional Holdings (%) Institutional Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Governance Score Range Aver -age Range Aver -age Range Aver -age Range Aver-age Range Aver-age 58-76 (62.5) 0.1-51.8 27.7 0.2-64.5 25.1 0.2-50.5 26.9 1.1-49.8 27.7 4-51.6 27.8 52-57 (54.3) .21-49.7 20.9 .04-53.7 15.2 .04-56.4 19.2 .03-53.4 19.7 .03-55.5 19.0 45-52 (48.7) .03-54.6 12.2 0.2-54.8 13.1 .01-55.5 16.1 .03-55.6 16.2 .06-58 16.8 26-45 (40.0) 0-29.6 6.36 0-43.0 8.1 0-44 9.6 0-33.1 9.4 0-36.4 9.3 Table 4.10 (b) Corporate Governance and Institutional Holdings Governance Score (%) Institutional Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant -17.44 -18.07 -17.48 -17.71 -17.02 b Value 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 SE 4.66 5.04 5.42 5.50 5.76 R2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 t-value 6.75* 6.73* 6.63* 6.63* 6.21* D/W 2.13 2.07 2.19 2.19 2.01 Predictor: Governance Score; Dependent Variable: Institutional Holdings *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table describe that sampled companies with higher governance score have larger proportions of institutional holdings and sampled companies with lower governance score have smaller proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. The sampled companies with highest average governance score of 62.5 score points have highest average institutional holdings over the study period. As it is 27.7 percent in 2004, 26.9 percent in 2006 and 27.8 percent in 2008. Similarly, sampled companies with higher average governance score of 54.3 score points have higher institutional holdings. It is 20.9 percent in 2004, 19.2 percent in 2006 and 19 percent at the end of the study period. To validate it more, it is observed that the sampled companies with lower average governance scores have lower average institutional holdings too. The sampled companies with the lowest average governance score of 40 points have lowest institutional hol dings of 6.36 percent in 2004, 9.6 percent in 2006 and 9.34 percent in 2008. Similarly, lower institutional holdings have been observed for the companies with lower average governance scores over the study period. Thus, it can be inferred from the above results that there is very strong and positive relationship between Corporate Governance Score and Institutional Holdings. The statistical significance of these findings through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. It also depicts that Corporate Governance Score and Institutional Holdings are very strongly related in all the years as the degree of dependence in terms b value is higher in all the years. All the values are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.3.2 Relationship between corporate governance and mutual funds holdings: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.11 as under: Part (a) in the study table reveals out the governance score along with the (%) mutual funds holdings for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to governance score and mutual funds holdings Table 4.11 (a) Corporate Governance and MF Holdings (%) MF Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Governance Score Range Aver -age Range Aver-age Range Aver -age Range Aver-age Range Aver-age 58-76 (62.5) 0-22.0 4.7 .07-24.4 4.9 0-27.2 5.2 .17-20.8 5.1 0-20.9 5.8 52-57 (54.3) 0-16.0 4.4 0-16.2 4.6 0-16.3 5.8 0-17.6 6.6 0-22.9 6.5 45-52 (48.7) 0-18.6 3.6 0-18.1 4.0 0-19.6 5.0 0-22.1 4.6 0-32.1 4.4 26-45 (40.0) 0-9.6 1.5 0-12.6 2.2 0-12.9 3.2 0-20.3 3.6 0-16.2 3.5 Table 4.11 (b) Corporate Governance and MF Holdings Governance Score (%) MF Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant -2.99 -0.93 1.14 1.82 0.53 b Value 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.14 SE 1.67 1.94 2.09 2.16 2.33 R2 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 t-value 3.97* 2.54* 1.78 1.49 1.98 D/W 2.10 1.85 1.95 2.02 2.19 Predictor: Governance Score; Dependent Variable: MF Holdings *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table reveals out that conclusive results are not obtained as to the association between Corporate Governance and Mutual Funds holdings. Higher governance scores have higher mutual funds holdings in the sampled companies in first two years of the study period only. The sampled companies in which the average governance score is highest have the highest institutional holdings of 4.7 percent in 2004. For the same category of mutual funds holdings, the average institutional holding is highest at 4.9 percent in 2005. Similarly, the companies in which average governance score is lowest, the average institutional holdings are also lowest in these very years. Hence, it can be inferred that there is strong and positive relationship between corporate governance scores and mutual funds holdings in these years. But same inference cannot be drawn for the other years of the study period. In 2006, the companies with moderate average govern ance score of 54.3 points have the highest mutual fund holdings of 5.8 percent. For the same category, the mutual funds holdings are highest at 6.6 percent in 2007 and 6.5 percent in 2008. Hence, it can be inferred that there exists weak relationship between corporate governance and mutual funds holdings. The statistical significance of these observations through regression analysis is presented in the second part of the table. The regression parameters also validate the conclusion drawn on the basis of above table, as the value of b is lower in all the years over the study period except for in 2004 and 2005. Similarly, values of only year 2004 and 2005 are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.3.3 Relationship between corporate governance and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.12 as under: Part (a) in the study table reveals out the governance score along with the (%) Banks, FIs and ICs holdings for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings Table 4.12 (a) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings and Corporate Governance Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Governance Score Range Aver-age Range Aver-age Range Aver-age Range Aver-age Range Aver -age 58-76 (62.5) .02-22.1 6.96 0.1-22.5 6.89 .03-21.2 6.41 .02-23.8 6.67 0-22.8 6.89 52-57 (54.3) 0-36.1 5.16 0-34.6 4.12 0-29.8 3.73 0-24.3 3.75 0-21.4 3.86 45-52 (48.7) 0-27.0 4.88 0-19.8 4.02 0-22.1 3.65 0-23.3 3.55 0-21.8 3.55 26-45 (40.0) 0-25.4 3.54 0-21.2 3.32 0-17.1 2.98 0-10.6 2.39 0-18.2 2.45 Table 4.12 (B) Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings and Corporate Governance Governance Score Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings (%) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant -2.57 -3.38 -3.08 -4.83 -4.83 b Value 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.30 SE 2.64 2.39 2.19 2.09 2.10 R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09 t-value 2.96* 3.39* 3.37* 4.33* 4.35* D/W 1.97 2.00 1.97 1.94 1.99 Predictor: Governance Score; Dependent Variable: Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table depicts that the higher corporate governance score have larger proportion of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings in the sampled companies over the study period. The sampled companies with highest average governance score of 62.5 score points have highest average holdings over the study period. As it is 6.96 percent in 2004, 6.89 percent in 2005 and 6.41 percent in 2006, 6.67 percent in 2007 and 6.89 percent in 2008. Similarly, sampled companies with higher average governance score of 54.3 score points have higher Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. It is 5.16 percent in 2004, 3.73 percent in 2006 and 3.86 percent at the end of the study period. To validate it more, it is observed that the sampled companies with lower average governance scores have lower average Banks, FIs and ICs holdings too. The sampled companies with the lowest average governance score of 40 points have lowest holdings of this category of institutional investors. It is 3.54 percent in 2004, 2.98 percent in 2006 and 2.45 percent in 2008. Similarly, lower institutional holdings have been observed for the companies with lower average governance scores over the study period. Thus, it can be inferred from the above results that there is very strong and positive relationship between Corporate Governance Score and Banks, FIs and ICs Holdings. The statistical significance of these observations through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. The parameters support the inferences drawn on the basis of part (a) of the present table, as the degree of dependence is higher in all the years. All the values are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. 4.3.4 Relationship between corporate governance and FII holdings: The results obtained in this regard are reported in an analytical frame in table no. 4.13 as under: Part (a) in the study table reveals out the governance score along with the (%) FII holdings for the study period 2004-08. Part (b) of the table depicts the regression parameters as regard to governance Score and FII holdings Table 4.13 (A) FII Holdings and Corporate Governance (%) FII Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Governance Score Range Aver -age Range Aver -age Range Aver-age Range Aver -age Range Aver -age 58-76 (62.5) 0-41.8 9.2 0-39.6 13.3 0-37.9 15.3 0.6-58 15.9 0-57 14.8 52-57 (54.3) 0-25.0 5.1 0-27.6 6.7 0-34.9 10 0-36.3 9.8 0-40 9.4 45-52 (48.7) 0-23.2 3.6 0-29.4 4.7 0-35.0 6.7 0-43.0 7.2 0-40 7.8 26-45 (40.0) 0-22.0 1.4 0-40.3 2.8 0-35.5 3.67 0-21.7 3.7 0-17 3.8 Table 4.13 (B) FII Holdings and Corporate Governance Governance Score (%) FII Holdings 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Constant -11.87 -13.76 -15.54 -14.68 -12.47 b Value 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.36 SE 2.84 3.40 3.85 3.99 3.97 R2 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 t-value 5.98* 6.15* 6.46* 6.07* 5.47* D/W 1.95 2.12 2.16 2.17 1.99 Predictor: Governance Score; Dependent Variable: FII Holdings *Significant at 5 percent level The information inputs reported in part (a) of the present table depicts that the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of FII holdings over the study period. The sampled companies with highest average governance score of 62.5 score points have highest average FII holdings over the study period. As it is 9.2 percent in 2004, 15.3 percent in 2006 and 14.8 percent in 2008. Similarly, sampled companies with higher average governance score of 54.3 score points have higher FII holdings too. It is 5.1 percent in 2004, 10 percent in 2006 and 9.4 percent at the end of the study period. To validate it more, it is observed that the sampled companies with lower average governance scores have lower average FII holdings too. The sampled companies with the lowest average governance score of 40 points have lowest FII holdings of 1.4 percent in 2004, 2.8 percent in 2005, 3.7 percent in 2006, 3.7 percent in 2007 and 3.8 percent in 2008. Similarly, lower institutiona l holdings have been observed for the companies with lower average governance scores over the study period. Thus, it can be inferred from the above results that there is very strong and positive relationship between Corporate Governance Score and FII Holdings. The statistical significance of these outcomes through regression analysis is reported in the part (b) of the present table. The regression parameters also support the inferences drawn on the basis of part (a) of the table. The degree of dependence in terms of b value is higher in all the years. All the values are considered significant (a=0.05) in terms of t-value over the study period. D/W value is near 2 in all the five years indicating the regression results are reliable. Resume The results of the third section describe that there is very strong and positive relationship between Corporate Governance Score and Institutional Holdings. The institutional investors have larger proportions of holdings in the companies with higher governance scores and smaller proportions of holdings in the companies with lower governance scores. But the results are mixed as to the relationship between corporate governance score and components of institutional holdings. As weak relationship exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. There is poor evidence as to companies with higher governance scores have higher proportions of mutual funds holdings and companies with lower governance scores have smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings. But on the other hand, very strong and positive relationship is observed between corporate governance score and Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies. The corporates with higher governance scores have h igher proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings where as the corporates with lower governance scores have lower proportions of these holdings. Likewise, very strong and positive relationship exists between corporate governance score and foreign institutional holdings as well. The companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of FII holdings while lower proportions of FIIs are observed in the companies with poor governance scores. Hence, it can be inferred that companies with better governance practices attract larger investments from institutional investors than the companies with poor governance practices. Similarly, good governed companies witness higher stakes from Banks, FIs and ICs as well. Foreign institutional investors also have greater investments in better-governed companies. But the alternate inference is drawn with respect to mutual funds. Resume At the end of this chapter, on the basis of result outputs of first section, it is inferred that institutional investors have been consistently showing greater interest in the sampled companies over the study period. The same inference is drawn for foreign institutional investors, one of the components of institutional investors. To the contrary, Banks, FIs and ICs are gradually reducing their stake, inferring that they are loosing interest in the sampled companies over the study period. But the result outputs for mutual funds do not help draw any inference regarding investment behaviour of mutual funds in the sampled companies over the study period. The inferences can be drawn on the basis of results outputs of second section that companies in which institutional investors have higher stake, observe better corporate governance practices than the companies with lower institutional stake. Institutional investors have significant positive impact over the governance practices adopted by the corporates. As the institutions increase their stake in the corporates, the governance practices show material improvement. Likewise, the companies with higher stake of Banks, FIs, ICs and FIIs also observe better governance practices than the companies with lower stake. Their higher stake also positively influences the corporate governance practices of companies. As they increase their proportions of holdings in the companies, the governance scores improve significantly. Likewise, the foreign institutional investors also have positive impact over the governance practices of companies. Companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have better governance practices to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions. But to the contrary, mutual funds do not have any impact over the governance practices adopted by companies. The sampled companies with higher proportions of mutual funds holdings are not depicting better governance scores to the companies with smaller proportions of holdings. The alternate inference is drawn for mutual funds. It is inferred on the basis of result outputs of the third section that the companies with better governance practices attract larger investments from institutional investors than the companies with poor governance practices. The institutions give due consideration to the governance practices adopted by the companies while taking investment decision. Similarly, good governed companies witness higher stakes from Banks, FIs and ICs as well. They also have larger proportions of holdings in the companies with better governance practices to the companies with poor governance practices. Likewise, foreign institutional investors also have greater investments in better-governed companies. They also give due weightage to the governance practices of the companies and increase stake only in the companies with good governance and decrease stake in the companies with poor governance. But the alternate inference is drawn with respect to mutual funds. The governance practices adopted by the compan ies have hardly any impact over their investment decision. They have rather increased their proportions of holdings in the sampled companies with poor governance scores to the companies with better governance scores.